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Abstract: This paper examines whether the economic aftermath of 9/11 had an adverse impact 
on the labor market outcomes of male immigrants from Latin America, who compose the bulk of 
undocumented foreign-born workers in the U.S.  The crackdown on use of fraudulent Social 
Security numbers, increased requirements for government-issued identification, and other 
changes associated with greater focus on national security likely lowered the demand for foreign-
born workers—particularly the undocumented—relative to natives after 9/11.  The relative 
decline in demand for such workers could have negatively affected employment, hours worked, 
and earnings.  Using Current Population Survey data and a difference-in-difference estimation 
technique, we find a negative impact after 9/11 on earnings and hours worked among recent male 
Hispanic immigrants vis-à-vis natives and a negative effect on employment, hours worked, and 
earnings vis-à-vis Hispanic immigrants who had been in the U.S. longer. 
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Did 9/11 Worsen the Job Prospects of Hispanic Immigrants? 
 
 
The tragic events of 9/11 made national security a priority.  Numerous reforms were 
enacted to offer greater protection from foreign enemies both within the nation and across the 
world.  The large illegal immigrant population—estimated at more than 8 million at that time—
came under heightened scrutiny as observers began to worry that terrorists could be hiding 
within it.  As a result, laws passed in the wake of 9/11 included a number of changes that 
affected undocumented immigrants and many legal immigrants as well, not just possible 
terrorists.  Many states implemented restrictions on driver’s licenses to prevent issuance of 
licenses and state identification cards to undocumented immigrants; enforcement of immigration 
laws was broadened to include state and local police officers; identification requirements were 
increased for new banking customers; the INS resurrected the address change notification rule 
for non-citizens; and immigration authorities were given greater powers to detain non-citizens 
without judicial review (Swarns 2003). 
Immigration proponents and Hispanic interest groups claimed that rather than catch 
terrorists, these changes harmed Latino workers (Waslin 2003).  For example, the effects of a 
federal crackdown on airport security, which was widely reported in the media, hurt immigrant 
workers, many of them Hispanic.  In 2002, the INS launched “Operation Tarmac,” a series of 
large-scale raids at airports that resulted in about 1200 undocumented workers being arrested, 
most of them Hispanic (Ashcroft 2003; Fazlollah 2003).  The airport crackdowns rooted out over 
4,000 undocumented workers (Porter 2003).  Many more undocumented workers likely quit on 
their own initiative for fear of being discovered and deported.  Hundreds of legal Hispanic (and   2
Asian) immigrant baggage screeners were also fired following the passage of a law requiring that 
all airport baggage screeners be U.S. citizens (Swarns 2003). 
One of the most far-reaching government actions following 9/11 was the Social Security 
Administration’s (SSA) “no-match” letter program.  Throughout 2002, the SSA sent out an 
unprecedented number of so-called “no match” letters to employers with workers whose Social 
Security numbers (SSN) were invalid (had never been issued) or did not match the name on 
SSA’s records.  This action was not intended to be a form of immigration enforcement but may 
have been quite effective as such and affected large numbers of Hispanic immigrants.  The SSA 
sent no-match letters to approximately 950,000 employers, each listing up to 500 Social Security 
numbers that did not match SSA’s records (National Immigration Law Center 2003).
1  
Employers fired thousands of Hispanic and other workers identified in no-match letters, 
assuming they were undocumented immigrants.  In addition, many workers identified in the 
letters quit their jobs out of concern that immigration authorities would follow up on the letters 
by raiding their workplace (Mehta, Nik, and Hincapie 2003).  Up to 100,000 workers—both 
documented and undocumented—may have lost jobs as a result of the letters (Sheridan 2002). 
In this paper, we investigate whether the post-9/11 changes discussed above resulted in 
worse employment and earnings outcomes for a group that contains many undocumented 
immigrants: low-skilled male recent immigrants from Latin America.  We focus on immigrants 
from Latin America because the vast majority of the undocumented are from that region.  
Estimates indicate that, as of 2000, Mexico accounted for about 69 percent of the foreign-born 
population illegally present in the United States.  El Salvador, Guatemala, Colombia, and 
                                                 
1Authorized workers may also generate no-match letters because a simple clerical error, the misspelling of a name, 
or other such mistakes can generate a mismatch between a SSN and the corresponding name.  However, the 
corrections rate following the no-match letter process is low, with fewer than 2 percent of records corrected, 
suggesting that the majority of cases in the SSA’s no-match letter program are unauthorized workers.   3
Honduras rounded out the top five source countries for illegal aliens.  Latin American countries 
accounted for at least 80 percent of undocumented immigrants (INS 2003; Passel, Capps, and Fix 
2004).  Further, over half of Mexican immigrants present in the U.S. were undocumented as of 
2004, including at least 80 percent of those who entered during the 1990s and early 2000s 
(Passel 2004, 2005a).  Although an increasing number of illegal aliens are children or female, the 
typical undocumented immigrant is a man aged 18 to 39 (Passel 2005a). 
Many things changed after 9/11, not just the national security environment.  The events 
of 9/11 may have had a direct effect on the labor market over and above the impact of the 
recession that was already underway.  The business cycle complicates isolating the effect of 
national security initiatives on the employment and earnings of undocumented immigrants 
following 9/11.  Studies suggest that the uncertainty associated with the political and 
macroeconomic environment after 9/11 may have kept employers from hiring, contributing to 
the jobless recovery in 2002 (e.g., Groshen and Potter 2003).  The events of 9/11 had a 
particularly adverse effect on hospitality and travel-related industries, which may have led to a 
disproportionately negative impact on Hispanic immigrants given their overrepresentation in 
those industries (Dillon 2001).  However, once hiring in the general economy picked up, the job 
growth of foreign-born workers recovered before that of natives, suggesting that macroeconomic 
conditions did not disproportionately harm immigrant workers.  Moreover, Hotchkiss and 
Pavlova (2004) find that average hours worked among the employed as a whole did not decline 
after 9/11 and in fact appear to have increased after controlling for the weak labor market. 
This study follows the approach of Kaushal, Kaestner, and Reimers (2004), who estimate 
the impact of 9/11 on the employment and earnings of first- and second-generation Arab and 
Muslim immigrants.  Kaushal et al. use a difference-in-differences estimation technique to   4
measure the change in labor market outcomes of Arabs and Muslims relative to two comparison 
groups, other non-Latin American immigrants and U.S. natives.  They argue that discrimination 
against Arabs and Muslims, fueled by the events of 9/11, should have led to worse job prospects 
for that population.  They find that 9/11 was associated with a statistically significant decline in 
the earnings of Arab and Muslim men but had no impact on their employment or hours worked. 
We find similar results among Hispanic immigrants, although we also find evidence of 
negative effects on employment and hours.  Using a similar difference-in-differences regression 
analysis, we compare employment, hours worked, and hourly and weekly earnings of low-skilled 
recent Hispanic immigrants to several comparison groups.  We find that while Hispanic 
immigrants who had been in the U.S. for at least 5 years experienced employment and earnings 
gains relative to white non-Hispanic natives during the post-9/11 period, more recent immigrants 
did not.  In addition to relative declines in employment and hours, average hourly earnings 
among recent Hispanic immigrants fell by about 5 percent after 9/11 compared with Hispanic 
immigrants who had been present in the U.S. longer.  Our results thus suggest that national 
security measures had negative economic repercussions for recent Hispanic immigrants in 
relative terms.  While a relative worsening of working conditions within the U.S. is unlikely to 
deter future undocumented immigration as long as overall conditions improve, it may result in 
less wage assimilation and greater earnings inequality.  In other words, stiffer security measures 
in the absence of immigration reform may have few benefits and some unintended costs. 
 
Post-9/11 Changes in the Market for Undocumented Workers  
The terrorist attacks of September 11
th were followed by a series of changes that likely 
affected both the demand and supply of undocumented labor.  Although none of the19 terrorists   5
had entered U.S. illegally (four had overstayed their visas), policymakers quickly recognized that 
a population of at least 8 million undocumented immigrants represented a possible threat to 
national security and implemented changes that likely squelched such workers’ job prospects.  
For employers, knowingly hiring undocumented workers has been illegal and punishable by civil 
and criminal penalties since the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986.  
Although this “employer sanctions” provision of IRCA is rarely enforced, 9/11 likely heightened 
employers’ concerns that the government would launch a crackdown.  Reinforcing this belief 
was the 2002 crackdown by the SSA on misuse of Social Security numbers discussed above, 
which was at that time the largest review of mismatched numbers since the beginning of the no-
match letter program in 1994.  Well-reported cases of INS lawsuits and raids (which primarily 
captured undocumented Hispanic workers) occurred at Tyson Chicken and Wal-Mart in late 
2001 and 2003, respectively.  However, despite these efforts to crack down on demand for 
undocumented workers, the employer sanctions caseload actually fell between 2001 and 2003 as 
law enforcement was directed at more specific targets, such as interviewing thousands, and 
detaining and deporting hundreds, of Muslim and Arab men. 
Media reports highlighted instances of undocumented workers, most of them Hispanic, 
being fired and replaced by workers with legal permission to work after 9/11.  Undocumented 
male workers typically have no access to the public safety net, such as unemployment insurance, 
forcing them to work at the best job available or soon leave the U.S.  Their extremely high (about 
96 percent) labor force participation rate attests to the importance of work among this population 
(Passel et al. 2004).  After 9/11, undocumented men may have quit or been fired from higher-
paying jobs and faced a choice between accepting lower wages from employers still willing to 
hire them or leaving the country.  Many workers who left jobs because of SSA no-match letters   6
simply moved on to other employers, sometimes in the underground economy (Sheridan 2002).  
This suggests that 9/11 may have had a larger effect on wages than on employment rates among 
undocumented immigrants. 
The stylized facts support the hypothesis that any negative effect was primarily on 
earnings rather than on employment.  New immigrants accounted for all net national job growth 
between 2000 and early 2004; the number of native born and established foreign born workers 
declined during this period, in contrast (Sum, Fogg, and Khatiwada 2004).  Most of these new 
immigrant workers were Hispanic males.  At the same time, median income among households 
headed by non-citizens fell by $2,000 between 2002 and 2003 (compared with a $135 increase 
for native households).  Median income for households headed by non-citizens also fell from 
2001 to 2002, both absolutely and relative to other households (U.S. Census Bureau 2003, 2004). 
The supply of new immigrant labor—especially undocumented—also may have changed 
after 9/11.  First, some Hispanic immigrants may have fled the U.S. after the attacks.  The 
Mexican government estimates that about 350,000 Mexicans returned home in the two months 
after 9/11 (Robertson 2002).  According to Passel (2005b), the annual flow of unauthorized 
migrants may have been slightly smaller after 2000 than during the late 1990s but remained 
extremely high.  This conclusion is supported by U.S. Department of Homeland Security data on 
apprehensions of illegal aliens along the Southwest border.  As the year-over-year changes in 
Figure 1 show, the start of the decline in apprehensions actually predates both the recession 
(which began in March 2001) and 9/11.  Importantly, the drop in apprehensions was not due to a 
change in enforcement effort.  Although the number of border patrol agents did drop slightly 
following 9/11 as officers were deployed to the largely understaffed Canadian border,   7
enforcement along the Mexican border regained lost ground beginning in late 2002.  
Apprehensions increased sharply earlier that year. 
The changes in border enforcement may also have affected the supply of undocumented 
labor among illegal aliens already present in the U.S.  Increases in border enforcement are 
associated with less circular migration because undocumented immigrants are reluctant to risk 
returning home and then being unable to reenter the U.S. (Reyes 2004).  The net effect of 9/11 
on the number of undocumented workers is thus impossible to ascertain.  
The series of legal reforms and broader enforcement of immigration laws mentioned in 
the Introduction also affected the market for immigrant workers during this time.  These tougher 
laws likely reduced both demand and supply of undocumented workers.  The USA Patriot Act, 
Enhanced Border Security Act, Homeland Security Act and Aviation Transportation and 
Security Act were all passed in the aftermath of 9/11.  The Patriot Act gave greater powers to 
immigration authorities, curbed the rights of non-citizens who were detained to judicial review, 
and required more record keeping and reporting by financial institutions.  States such as Virginia, 
West Virginia, Florida, and Utah began requiring proof of legal residence for issuance of state 
id’s and driver’s licenses.  The Enhanced Border Security Act required enhanced background 
checks for visa applicants both at home and abroad.  Resultant visa processing backlogs resulted 
in a dramatic drop in tourist and business travel to the U.S.  The Homeland Security Act divided 
the INS into three separate entities, separating the service side from the enforcement function of 
the immigration service.  Airport security personnel became federal agents.  Background and 
security checks proliferated and many office buildings began requiring workers and visitors to 
present identification to gain entry.   8
Changes in the demand and supply of undocumented workers following 9/11 were likely 
confounded by the effects of the recession.  According to the NBER Business Cycle Dating 
Committee, the recession started in March 2001 and ended in November that year.  Despite the 
November end date, the job market remained sluggish until at least mid-2003.  The lack of job 
opportunities almost certainly also affected the demand and supply of undocumented workers.  
Our analysis takes this into account in two ways.  We control for economic conditions explicitly 
by including two state-level indicators of economic activity similar to the national ones that the 
NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee utilizes, and we compare the change in labor market 




The data we use are from the Current Population Survey (CPS) monthly outgoing 
rotation group files for 1999-2003, excluding the month of September 2001.  This study focuses 
on men in order to avoid problems with labor force participation, which is more of an issue for 
women, and because immigrant women’s labor force participation behavior differs markedly 
from that of native women (Schoeni 1998).  The sample used here includes only men aged 18-39 
who have at most a high school diploma.  We do not include older individuals since the majority 
of undocumented men are under age 40 (Passel 2005a).  We include men as young as age 18 
because most Hispanic immigrants this age are in the labor force; only 9 percent of 18-24 year-
old male Hispanic immigrants are enrolled in school full time and not working, according to the 
CPS.
3  We only include men who do not report having any post-secondary education because 
                                                 
2 There is some evidence that the effect of the business cycle differs across racial and ethnic groups (e.g., DeFreitas 
1991; Reimers 2000).  We control for differential effects of the business cycle by interacting state-level controls 
with the treatment dummy, as explained in the text below. 
3 We therefore did not use current enrollment status to select the sample.   9
most Hispanic immigrants have relatively little education; less than 18 percent of male Hispanic 
immigrants aged 18-39 report having any education beyond the high school level.  In addition, 
any effect of 9/11 is likely to be concentrated among less-educated immigrants because 
undocumented immigrants, who have much lower education levels than legal immigrants, 
compose a larger fraction of the pool of less-educated immigrants.
4 
Since 1994, the monthly CPS has asked about place of birth, citizenship status, and the 
year that foreign-born individuals came to the U.S.  Only individuals who report being born in a 
Latin American country and not being U.S. citizens at birth (because of parental citizenship) are 
included as Hispanic immigrants here.  The majority (70 percent) of the immigrant sample are 
from Mexico, followed by 7 percent from El Salvador. 
Part of the analysis distinguishes between immigrants who are relatively recent arrivals in 
the U.S. and those who have been in the U.S. for a long period of time.  We divide immigrants 
into those present about 4 or fewer years in the U.S., those present approximately 5-10 years, and 
those in the U.S. for more than 10 years.  Because the CPS reports year of entry in intervals, 
these categories are not exact; for the 2000 and 2002 survey years, the most recent immigrants 
arrived within the last 3 years and the least recent over 11 years ago.  It should also be noted that 
the number of years in the U.S. is based on reported year of entry, but it is not clear whether 
immigrants reported the year they entered the U.S. to stay or when they first came to the U.S.  
The data may therefore underestimate total years of residence in the U.S.  The analysis compares 
                                                 
4 Surveys of undocumented Mexican immigrants in the U.S. suggest that only 6 to 15 percent (depending on the year 
of entry) of males have 12 or more years of education (Orrenius and Zavodny 2005).  Passel (2005b) reports that 
about three-quarters of unauthorized adult immigrants have at most a high school education.   10
Hispanic immigrants across the three arrival groups and also compares them to two groups of 
natives: non-Hispanic whites and Hispanics, who can be of any race.
5 
The hypothesis underlying our comparison of immigrants by years of residence in the 
U.S. is that years of residence proxies for legal status and other factors likely to affect how 
immigrants’ labor market outcomes changed after 9/11.  The CPS does not ask whether the 
foreign-born are legally present in the U.S. or their visa status, just whether immigrants are 
naturalized citizens or not.  We assume that more recent immigrants (who are not naturalized 
citizens) are more likely to lack legal documents whereas those present in the U.S. for a longer 
time are more likely to be legal permanent residents or U.S. citizens.  Unpublished estimates by 
Jeffrey Passel suggest that about 62 percent of the undocumented population present in the U.S. 
in March 2003 entered the U.S. between 1995 and 2003; 22 percent during the period 1990-
1994; and about 15 percent in 1989 or earlier.
6  As discussed above, we posit that illegal 
immigrants—and therefore more recent immigrants since a larger fraction of them are illegal—
were more adversely affected by 9/11.  Shorter length of residence in the U.S. is also likely to be 
associated with less social capital and other attributes that would mitigate any negative effects of 
9/11 on labor market outcomes. 
An important issue for this study is whether the CPS includes undocumented Hispanic 
immigrants.  Illegal aliens may be reluctant to complete a survey conducted by the U.S. 
government even though they are told that the answers are confidential and the survey can be 
administered in Spanish.  But demographic research suggests illegal immigrants are in the CPS 
                                                 
5 Hispanic immigrants can also be of any race.  We do not use respondents’ answer to the Hispanic ethnicity 
question to determine whether they are Hispanic, only their country of birth.  About 5 percent of immigrants from 
Latin America do not report being of Hispanic origin.  The results are robust to dropping these immigrants from the 
sample. 
6  Passel (2005) provides similar statistics for March 2004.  In the 1999-2003 CPSs, about 3 percent of Hispanic 
immigrants who arrived in the U.S. less than 5 years ago report being U.S. citizens, compared with 7 percent of 
those who arrived 5-10 years ago and 33 percent of those who arrived more than 10 years ago.   11
since the number of immigrants enumerated by the survey (and by the decennial Census, upon 
which the CPS weights are based) exceeds estimates of the number of the foreign-born legally 
present in the U.S., particularly in certain groups consistent with the profile of undocumented 
immigrants (e.g., young adult males from Latin American countries).
7  As a result, researchers 
use the CPS to estimate the number of undocumented immigrants; they first calculate the total 
number of foreign born (based on estimates from the CPS and Census), subtract naturalized 
citizens and the estimated number of immigrants and non-immigrants who are legally present 
(based in part on other data sources such as the Department of Homeland Security), and adjust 
for undercounting (e.g., Passel 2004, 2005a,b; Passel et al. 2004).  This methodology suggests 
that the CPS does contain illegal aliens, although they are almost certainly underrepresented in 
the survey.  Estimates of the CPS undercount change over time.  In the late 1990s, for example, 
the CPS probably missed between one-quarter and one-third of illegal immigrants (Passel and 
Fix 2001).  Post-2000, the undercount is thought to be much improved, with the CPS covering 
about the same share of the illegal immigrant population—about 90 percent—as the 2000 Census 
(Passel, Van Hook, and Bean 2004).    
We examine four measures of labor market outcomes: employment, hours worked last 
week given employment (i.e., not including individuals with zero hours), hourly earnings, and 
weekly earnings.  For salaried workers, hourly earnings are calculated by dividing weekly 
earnings by usual weekly hours.  Both measures of earnings are deflated using the monthly 
consumer price index for urban workers (CPI-U, with 1982-84=100).  The regressions are 
estimated using the natural log of real hourly and weekly earnings.
8 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
7 Groups are based on age, sex, country of birth, period of entry, and state of residence (see Passel, Van Hook, and 
Bean 2004). 
   12
Hispanic immigrants are more likely to work than natives but have lower earnings.  As 
the sample means in the first row of Table 1 show, Hispanic immigrants had higher employment 
rates than white, non-Hispanic and Hispanic natives both before and after September 2001.  
Among those employed, Hispanic immigrants worked fewer hours on average than white, non-
Hispanic natives but more than Hispanic natives.  Hispanic immigrants had lower earnings than 
the comparison groups both before and after September 2001.  Employment rates were lower 
post-9/11 for all three groups (and average hours lower for Hispanic immigrants and white, non-
Hispanic natives), while real hourly earnings were higher. 
The sample means suggest little relative decline in Hispanic immigrants’ relative labor 
market outcomes after September 2001.  They experienced less of a decline in employment rates 
than either group of natives and also experienced a larger gain in average hourly earnings than 
white, non-Hispanic natives.  Average hours worked among employed Hispanic immigrants did 
decline more than among Hispanic natives, however, and the increase in average hourly earnings 
was also smaller among the foreign born than among Hispanic natives. 
Among Hispanic immigrants, employment, hours worked, and earnings tend to increase 
with years of residence in the U.S., as the sample means in Table 2 indicate.  Employment rates 
and hours were lower among all three duration groups after September 2001, with the losses not 
significantly different across the groups.  Average hourly earnings rose after 9/11 for Hispanic 
immigrants who have been in the U.S. for at least 5 years; the gain among the most recent 
immigrants, in contrast, is not statistically significant.  The sample means thus suggest that any 
adverse effects of 9/11 were concentrated on the earnings of the most recent immigrants relative 
to their more experienced compatriots. 
                                                                                                                                                             
8 We only include individuals with real hourly earnings above $1 per hour and below $100 per hour.  The results are 
qualitatively similar (with larger coefficients in absolute magnitude) if we instead drop observations in the top and   13
The next section describes the econometric methodology we use to examine how 
Hispanic immigrants’ job prospects changed relative to natives and previous Hispanic 
immigrants after 9/11 when controlling for observable characteristics and the business cycle. 
 
Methods 
We use a difference-in-differences (DD) method to estimate the effect of 9/11 on 
Hispanic immigrants’ relative labor force outcomes.  The method compares the change in 
Hispanic immigrants’ outcomes after September 2001 with the change in outcomes for a 
comparison group.  As noted above, we use white, non-Hispanic natives and Hispanic natives as 
comparison groups.  We also do comparisons among Hispanic immigrants by length of residence 
in the U.S. 
The DD method requires relatively few identifying assumptions.  The methodology is 
essentially a before and after comparison of an affected, or “treatment,” group’s outcomes with 
the change in outcomes among an unaffected control group.  The key identifying assumption is 
that there is no factor other than the event under investigation—in this study, 9/11—that causes 
the treatment group’s outcomes to change differently than the control group’s outcomes.  The 
main other factor likely to influence labor market outcomes is the recession that occurred from 
March until November 2001.  As discussed below, we include controls for the business cycle. 
The basic ordinary least squares regression model we estimate for all of the outcomes is 
 
Yist = α + β1Sept11t + β2Immigi + β3Sept11t*Immigi + γDemogi + 
δ1BusCyclest + δ2Immigi*BusCyclest + σSs + τTt + εist , 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
bottom five percent of the hourly earnings distribution.   14
where Yist is a measure of labor market outcomes for individual i, who lives in state s and is 
surveyed at time t.  The dummy variable Sept11t is equal to one if an observation is after 
September 11, 2001.  Immigi is a dummy variable equal to one for an immigrant in the treatment 
group.  The coefficient on the interaction of the two dummy variables, β3, measures the average 
change in labor market outcomes after 9/11 for the treatment group relative to the control group 
and therefore is the coefficient of interest and is presented in the tables that report regression 
results. 
We control for several measures of individuals’ demographic characteristics in the vector 
Demogi.  The regressions include linear variables for age and its square and indicator variables 
for not having a high school diploma or equivalent, for being married, and for living in an urban 
area.  They also include an indicator variable for being a U.S. citizen and a linear variable 
measuring years of residence in the U.S. (calculated using the midpoint of the interval for year of 
arrival); these variables are equal to one and zero, respectively, for natives. 
The regressions control for business cycle conditions with state-level measures of real 
personal income per capita and the employment rate (among persons age 16 and older).  Personal 
income is reported quarterly by the Bureau of Economic Analysis while the employment data are 
reported monthly by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
9  We use these variables as proxies for the 
two primary variables used by the NBER to determine expansions and contractions: payroll 
employment and real personal income.
10  The two business cycle variables are interacted with 
the treatment group dummy variable to control for the possibility that cyclical factors affect that 
group differently than the comparison group.  All regressions also include state and month fixed 
                                                 
9 We used annual population estimates from the Census Bureau.  We deflated personal income using the CPI-U. 
10 We do not use unemployment rates because they are a lagging indicator of the business cycle.   15
effects, Ss and Tt, respectively.  Standard errors are White-Huber corrected for heteroscedasticity 
and clustered on treatment group status before and after September 2001. 
 
Results 
The regression results generally do not indicate that 9/11 had a negative impact on the 
employment and earnings of male Hispanic immigrants as a whole.  Rather, they suggest that 
some groups of Hispanic immigrants benefited at the cost of others.  In particular, recent 
immigrants appear to have experienced adverse effects while those present in the U.S. for at least 
5 years may have actually experienced an improvement in some labor market outcomes relative 
to white, non-Hispanic natives after 9/11. 
Hispanic immigrants overall experienced few declines in labor market outcomes relative 
to white, non-Hispanic natives after 9/11, as the results in the top panel of Table 3 show.  
Employment rose among Hispanic immigrants as a whole compared with white, non-Hispanic 
natives, with the relative increase concentrated among those present in the U.S. at least 10 years.  
Relative average hourly earnings rose by about 3.6 percent among Hispanic immigrants present 
in the U.S. for at least 5 years (columns 2 and 3, row 3).  The significant negative effects were 
concentrated among the most recent Hispanic immigrants, whose relative hourly earnings fell by 
about 2 percent (column 4, row 3).  The most recent and the most experienced immigrants also 
experienced a relative drop in hours after 9/11.  For the most experienced immigrants, the drop in 
hours was counterbalanced by the relative gains in hourly earnings, but the most recent 
immigrants experienced a relative decline in weekly earnings as well (column 4, row 4). 
Hispanic immigrants as a whole experienced more adverse effects when compared with 
Hispanic natives.  As the results in the bottom panel of Table 3 indicate, employment among   16
immigrants rose relative to comparable Hispanic natives; the relative increase occurred among 
immigrants present in the U.S. for at least 5 years but not among more recent arrivals (row 5).  
Hours fell after 9/11 among Hispanic immigrants, with the relative decline occurring among all 
three arrival groups (row 6).  Average hourly earnings also fell by almost 6 percent among the 
most recent immigrants compared with Hispanic natives.  Immigrants present in the U.S. for less 
than 5 years and for at least 10 years experienced significant relative losses in weekly earnings as 
well. 
This finding that Hispanic immigrants experienced fewer gains—and often larger 
losses—when compared with Hispanic natives than with white, non-Hispanic natives is 
somewhat surprising given that Hispanic natives also might have been adversely affected by the 
post-9/11 changes in the labor market.  One might expect that some employers lump all 
Hispanics together, causing some Hispanic natives to experience an increase in discrimination 
after 9/11.  Other research has found evidence of such “spillover” effects.  Research on the 
effects of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), which included a legalization 
program and created penalties for firms that knowingly employ undocumented workers, indicates 
that wages and employment among Hispanics in general fell after IRCA went into effect (Bansak 
2001; Lowell, Teachman, and Jing 1995).  In our work, however, DD regressions with Hispanic 
natives as the treatment group and white, non-Hispanic natives as the control group suggest that 
Hispanic natives actually experienced a relative gain in hours and hourly earnings after 9/11 (not 
shown).  This suggests that Hispanic natives did not experience an increase in labor market 
discrimination after 9/11.
11 
                                                 
11 It is possible that, given the growth in the Hispanic population and the increased diversity of people of Hispanic 
descent, that employers have become more sophisticated and can now better distinguish between Hispanics who are 
foreign versus native-born.  Native Hispanics’ language ability, educational background, and access to authentic 
identification cards likely help employers make this distinction.  Moreover, if Hispanic natives are closer substitutes   17
The comparisons to natives in Table 3 suggest that Hispanic immigrants who arrived in 
the U.S. within about the last 5 years experienced more adverse effects than their compatriots 
who had been in the U.S. longer.  To further investigate this finding, we estimated the DD 
regressions using only the sample of Hispanic immigrants and comparing immigrants by length 
of residence in the U.S.  The results are shown in Table 4.  The column headings indicate first 
the treatment group and second the comparison group; for example, the first column reports 
results for immigrants who arrived within the last 5 years relative to immigrants who arrived 
over 10 years ago. 
The comparisons across immigrants by duration of residence in the U.S. confirm that the 
most recent immigrants experienced adverse effects after 9/11.  Employment and hourly earnings 
declined significantly among immigrants who arrived in the U.S. within the last 5 years relative 
to immigrants present in the U.S. longer.  For example, recent immigrants experienced a decline 
in earnings of about 4.7 percent after 9/11 relative to immigrants who had been in the U.S. for 
over 10 years and of almost 6 percent compared with immigrants who had been in the U.S. for 
about 5-10 years (columns 1 and 2, row 3).  The most recent immigrants also experienced a loss 
in hours compared with those present in the U.S. 5-10 years (column 2, row 2).  The results 
comparing immigrants who arrived about 5-10 years ago with those who had been in the U.S. 
longer are mixed, with immigrants who arrived about 5-10 years ago experiencing a relative gain 
in hours but not in employment or hourly earnings (column 3). 
The regression results for the other coefficients in the DD regressions are as expected.  In 
results not shown here, Hispanic immigrants are more likely to be employed and work more 
hours than natives but have lower average earnings.  Among immigrants, employment and hours 
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might lead to relatively higher demand for Hispanic natives.   18
of work are negatively associated with length of residence in the U.S. while hourly earnings are 
positively associated with years of U.S. residence and with U.S. citizenship.  Employment, 
hours, and earnings all increase with age but at a decreasing rate.  Men who did not complete 
high school or are single have worse labor market outcomes than high school graduates or 
married men, respectively.  The business cycle controls and their interactions with the treatment 
indicator variable are jointly significantly different from zero below the 10 percent level in most 
of the regressions. 
 
Robustness 
The results in the tables include all immigrants from Latin America, not just those from 
Mexico, which is the main source of Latin American immigrants and undocumented immigrants.  
When the regressions are estimated using just immigrants born in Mexico instead of all Latin 
American countries, the results are similar to those shown in the tables but tend to have slightly 
lower significance levels, reflecting the decrease in the sample size.  The results are also robust 
to including country of origin controls for the foreign born. 
We tried including interactions between the 9/11 dummy variable and the variables 
measuring years of U.S. residence and U.S. citizenship in the regressions in order to examine 
whether the return to U.S. experience or citizenship changed after September 11
th.  The results 
do not consistently indicate that the return to years of residence in the U.S. or to U.S. citizenship 
changed significantly after 9/11 among Hispanic immigrants.  We suspect our failure to find 
significant effects may be due in part to measurement error in these variables; immigrants may 
have lied about their citizenship status, particularly after 9/11, and problems with the variable 
reporting the year of arrival in the U.S. are well known (e.g., Redstone and Massey 2004).   19
  
Conclusion 
This paper used CPS data to examine post-9/11 changes in the employment, hours, and 
earnings of Hispanic immigrants, particularly those likely to be illegally present in the U.S.  
Although we cannot directly observe illegal immigrants in the CPS data, we use recent male 
immigrants from Latin America aged 18-39 who have at most completed high school to proxy 
for this population.  We postulate that 9/11 created an environment that discouraged employers 
from hiring potentially undocumented workers, which should lead to worse labor market 
outcomes in the data for the group of immigrants most similar to illegal aliens—recent male non-
citizen immigrants from Mexico and the rest of Latin America.  We use several comparison 
groups to control for confounding changes in the demand and supply of labor during this time. 
The empirical evidence suggests that recent Latin American immigrants experienced 
employment and earnings declines as a result of 9/11.  While Hispanic immigrants with longer 
residence in the U.S. (and Hispanic natives) had significant employment and earnings gains after 
9/11 relative to white, non-Hispanic natives, recent Hispanic immigrants did not experience such 
an improvement.  Recent Hispanic immigrants, in contrast, had real hourly earnings declines of 
about 2 percent relative to white, non-Hispanic natives, 6 percent relative to Hispanic natives, 
and 5 percent relative to Hispanic immigrants who have been here at least 5 years.  In addition, 
recent Hispanic immigrants experienced a decline in employment relative to their compatriots 
with more experience in the U.S.  The evidence thus suggests the post-9/11 changes in the labor 
market and, more broadly, the national security environment, have adversely affected the job 
prospects of recent male undocumented immigrants from Latin America.   20
  Worsened job prospects for Hispanic immigrants have important implications for the 
immigrant inflow.  The decline in the relative labor market outcomes of recent male immigrants 
from Latin America—if it is sustained over time and holding all other factors constant—should 
lead to a decline in the probability of migrating to the U.S. in the future.  However, this may or 
may not translate into fewer Hispanic immigrants, illegal or otherwise, depending on how other 
push and pull factors play out.  If economic conditions worsen in source countries, then this 
slight worsening of relative labor market outcomes for Hispanic immigrants in the U.S. will not 
have a big negative impact on migrant inflows.  Moreover, the average level of real hourly 
earnings for recent Hispanic immigrants was actually higher in the post-9/11 period than during 
the prior two and a half years.   
Such absolute changes, together with economic conditions in the home country, may play 
a larger role in migration decisions than labor market outcomes relative to natives or earlier 
immigrants.  Indeed, there appears to have been only a small reduction in the flow of 
undocumented immigrants in the post-2000 period (Passel 2005b) even as their relative labor 
market outcomes appear to have worsened.  Security measures which indirectly address 
undocumented immigration may be more likely to increase earnings inequality and other relative 
measures of well-being within the U.S., such as earnings assimilation, than they are to affect 
future migrant flows to the U.S.  Given that illegal immigrants have little access to public 
services, it may be preferable to implement immigration reform directly by either enforcing 
immigration laws or legalizing immigrants who are already here or both.  Simply making 
conditions worse for illegal immigrants already present may exacerbate the social problems 
inherent to growing income inequality.  Assessing the full impact of post-9/11 changes in 
immigration law enforcement is an area for future research.    21
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Descriptive Statistics for Immigrants and Natives, Pre- and Post-9/11 
   
 Hispanic  White,  Non-Hispanic  Hispanic 
   Immigrants     Natives     Natives   
  Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post   
 
Employment  0.89 0.88 0.83 0.78 0.76 0.71 
  (0.31) (0.33) (0.37) (0.41) (0.42) (0.45) 
  [8609]  [8880] [42932]  [38681] [5256]  [5011] 
 
Hours  worked  40.8 39.9 41.5 40.5 39.7 39.4 
  (9.2)  (9.1)  (12.7) (12.5) (11.0) (10.0) 
  [7558]  [7648] [34786]  [29732] [3911]  [3519] 
 
Hourly  earnings  5.52 5.73 7.27 7.34 6.22 6.71 
  (2.75) (2.57) (3.75) (3.84) (3.07) (3.34) 
  [7232]  [7313] [31610]  [26913] [3749]  [3336] 
 
Weekly  earnings  230.58 233.09 314.31 313.17 260.64 276.93 
  (125.82) (115.20) (187.23) (194.07) (156.24) (160.55) 
  [7232]  [7313] [31609]  [26913] [3749]  [3336]  
 
Note: Shown are weighted sample means, with standard deviations in parentheses and sample size in brackets.  
Hourly and weekly earnings are deflated using the monthly CPI-U (1982-84=100).  Data are from the CPS monthly 
outgoing rotation groups for 1999-2003, excluding September 2001, and only include men who have at most a high 
school diploma and are aged 18-39.   26
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics for Immigrants by Length of Residence in U.S., Pre- and Post-9/11 
   
   >10  Years     5-10  Years     <5  Years  
  Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post   
 
Employment  0.90 0.88 0.90 0.88 0.88 0.84 
  (0.30) (0.32) (0.30) (0.32) (0.33) (0.37) 
  [4230] [3999] [2825] [3177] [1554] [1704] 
 
Hours  worked  41.2 40.3 40.5 39.7 40.4 39.4 
  (9.2) (9.0) (9.1) (8.9) (9.1) (9.4) 
  [3716] [3442] [2497] [2784] [1345] [1422] 
 
Hourly  earnings  6.01 6.30 5.15 5.42 4.86 4.93 
  (3.02) (2.87) (2.59) (2.35) (1.93) (1.73) 
  [3511] [3270] [2407] [2661] [1314] [1382] 
 
Weekly  earnings  254.79 258.04 212.41 219.46 199.13 198.49 
  (139.00) (130.59) (109.71)  (98.04)  (101.63)  (89.73) 
  [3511] [3270] [2407] [2661] [1314] [1382]  
 
Note: Shown are weighted sample means, with standard deviations in parentheses and sample size in brackets.  
Hourly and weekly earnings are deflated using the monthly CPI-U (1982-84=100).  Data are from the CPS monthly 
outgoing rotation groups for 1999-2003, excluding September 2001, and only include men born in Latin America 
(and not U.S. citizens by birth) who have at most a high school diploma and are aged 18-39.  27
Table 3 
Difference-in-Differences Estimates of the Effect of 9/11 on Hispanic Immigrants 
Compared with Natives 
   
    Length of Residence in U.S.   
Outcome  All  >10 Years  5-10 Years  <5 Years   
 
Compared with White, Non-Hispanic Natives 
Employment 0.010* 0.018*  0.008
† -0.015 
 (0.003)  (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.007) 
 
Hours worked  -0.169  -0.214*  -0.067  -0.332
† 
 (0.077)  (0.053)  (0.074)  (0.128) 
 
Hourly earnings  0.026**  0.036**  0.036**  -0.020* 
 (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.004) 
 
Weekly earnings  0.019*  0.017**  0.040**  -0.013**
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
 
Compared with Hispanic Natives 
Employment 0.023**  0.033**
  0.022** 0.001 
 (0.002)  (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.007) 
 
Hours  worked -0.587** -0.723**  -0.443* -0.737* 
 (0.062)  (0.071)  (0.095)  (0.165) 
 
Hourly earnings  -0.012  -0.003  -0.002  -0.058** 
 (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.006) 
 
Weekly  earnings  -0.032* -0.038*  -0.013 -0.057** 
 (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.005)   
 
** p<0.01; * p<0.05; 
† p<0.1 
Note: Shown are OLS estimates of the change in immigrants’ labor outcomes relative to the indicated comparison 
group of natives from January 1999-August 2001 to October 2001-December 2003. Each coefficient is from a 
separate regression.  All regressions also control for demographic characteristics, state-level business cycle 
conditions, state and month (see text for details).  Hourly and weekly earnings are measured as the log of real 
earnings.  Robust clustered standard errors are in parentheses.  28
Table 4 
Difference-in-Differences Estimates of the Effect of 9/11 within Hispanic Immigrants, by 
Years of Residence in U.S. 
    
Outcome  <5 vs >10  <5 vs 5-10  5-10 vs >10   
 
Employment -0.028* -0.020*  -0.008 
 (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.004) 
 
Hours worked  0.026  -0.200*  0.368** 
 (0.091)  (0.051)  (0.045) 
 
Hourly earnings  -0.047**  -0.056**  0.005 
 (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.003) 
 
Weekly earnings  -0.011
† -0.046**  0.028** 
 (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002)   
 
** p<0.01; * p<0.05; 
† p<0.1 
Note: Shown are OLS estimates of the change in the first indicated group of immigrants’ labor outcomes relative to 
the second indicated group of immigrants from January 1999-August 2001 to October 2001-December 2003.  Each 
coefficient is from a separate regression.  All regressions also control for demographic characteristics, state-level 
business cycle conditions, state and month (see text for details).  Hourly and weekly earnings are measured as the 
log of real earnings.  Robust clustered standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 